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This work inquires into the genealogy of self-interest, from half XVII century to the
publication of The Wealth of Nations, in 1776, which is considered to be the foundation
of Modern Economic Science. The selfish hypothesis –the idea that self-interest is the
motive of human action–, which is based on an Epicurean-Agustinian scheme, will be
placed in the Smith neo-Stoic perspective. Otherwise, political and economical argu-
ments for Capitalism before his triumph will be analized, in relation with the evolution
of passions and interests.
Keywords: Self-interest, Self-love, Passions, Interest, Selfish hypothesis, Epicurean,
Agustinian, Neo-Stoic, Interested-disinterested commerce.
En el presente trabajo se analiza la génesis del concepto de interés propio, desde media-
dos del siglo XVII hasta la publicación de La riqueza de las naciones, en 1776, conside-
rado el comienzo de la Ciencia Económica Moderna. Se cuestiona el lugar que ocupa la
hipótesis egoísta -según la cual las personas solo actúan por motivos de interés propio-,
que responde a un esquema de pensamiento epicúreo-agustiniano, en el Sistema de
Smith, cuyo enfoque parece ser neo-estoico. Asimismo, se analizan los argumentos polí-
ticos y económicos a favor del capitalismo, previos a su triunfo, en relación a la evolución
de las pasiones y los intereses.
Palabras clave: Interés propio, Amor propio, Pasiones, Hipótesis egoísta, Epicúrea,
Agustiniana, Neo-estoico, Comercio interesado-desinteresado.
It is generally assumed that the publication of The Wealth of Nations,
in 1776, marked the birth of modern Economic Science, and the
triumph of the interest paradigm (the idea that self-interest is the
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main motive of human action)1. As a result, Adam Smith is consi-
dered the father of this paradigm, known as the “selfish hypothesis”.
However, as it is emphasized in Force’s work2, while the roots of
this hypothesis are neo-Epicurean, and had been the result of a large
ideological debate, Smith’s position seems to be a neo-Stoic3 one. 
In 1977, Albert Hirschman, in his well-known The Passions and the
Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph4, looks
for the connections between the modern concept of self-interest and
the development of moral philosophy in the seventeenth century. It
is widely accepted that Adam Smith constructed his political eco-
nomy upon this axiom. Hirschman shows how the use of the term
interest has changed in the course of the evolution of language and
ideas, being reduced to the economical meaning rather late in the
history of the term5. 
There is a long controversial tradition before Smith that shows
different angles of the question. Without taking the credit away
from his work, we could affirm that his originality was the synthesis
of the dominant ideas of different traditions. As Martínez-
Echevarría says: “It must be recognized that his work [Smith] is not
a role model of originality and innovation. It is not necessary to
make a deep criticism to see how he appropriates, freely, of the eco-
nomic ideas developed by his predecessors. […] However, if he was
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1 Stigler characterizes Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations as a “stupendous palace
erected upon the granite of self-interest”. Edgeworth asserted that “the first prin-
ciple of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest”. See Force,
P. (2006), p. 7.
2 Force, P. (2006).
3 Neo-Stoicism is the term employed to refer to the renewed Stoic ideas appearing
during the European Renaissance (ie, fifteenth to seventeenth centuries). See
López-Peláez Casellas, J. (2004).
4 Hirschman, A. (1977).
5 Hirschman, A. (1977), p. 32.
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capable of systematize and coordinate them, it was because he sen-
sed the basic problem of what today is called market economy: to
combine private initiative with common interest”6.
Indeed, “the main impact of The Wealth of Nations was to establish
a powerful economic justification for the untrammelled pursuit of
individual self-interest”7. In order to support this idea, a famous pas-
sage is generally quoted: “it is not from the benevolence of the but-
cher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from
their regard to their own interest”8. However, the term self-interest
is remarkably rare in The Wealth of Nations, where Smith usually uses
the term own interest. Self-interest appears only once in this work, in
the context of a discussion of religion, when Smith argue that
Catholic priests work harder than Protestant ones because they
depend upon voluntary gifts from their parishioners9. In the passa-
ge quoted, Smith does not refer to self-interest but rather to self-
love10. Force warned about the temptation of using them as
synonyms, and he describes the self-love, or his French equivalent
amour-propre, as “the translation of a technical term used by
Renaissance humanists, philautia”11, which carries with a long phi-
losophical and literary tradition. 
In the time when Smith wrote his works, the dominant view was the
interest doctrine, which supports that selfish motives are behind all
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6 Martínez-Echevarría, M.A. (1983), p. 52.
7 Hirschman, A. (1977), p. 100.
8 WN I.2.2, p. 26.
9 Smith explains that “[in the Catholic Church] the industry and zeal of the infe-
rior clergy are kept more alive by the powerful motive of self-interest than perhaps
in any established Protestant church”. WN V.i.3.3, p. 789.
10 “We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never
talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages”. WN I.ii.2, p. 27. 
11 Philautia is itself the transliteration of a term used by Plato.
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human actions12. This position has a close relation with Epicurean
ethics and caused the most important division between moral philo-
sophers. Hume rejects this idea, which he calls the “selfish hypothe-
sis”, and Smith follows him in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, where
he criticizes Epicurus’s moral system for being constructed in a first
principle. It is well known that for Epicurus, prudence was “the
source and principle of all virtues”13, and it is based mainly in
self-interest. Smith explicitly rejects the interest doctrine14 and inte-
grates it at the same time, conceiving the political and moral equili-
brium as a consequence of the natural harmony between individual
passions –interests- and social welfare. Consequently, self-interest
motives, instead of a sign of natural selfishness, are the result of a
providential harmony. 
By the middle of eighteenth century, the interest doctrine had rea-
ched an extraordinary success. The most famous presentation of this
doctrine is Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees, in which he sus-
tains that “a society which was endowed with all the ‘virtues’ would
be a static and stagnant society. It is when individuals, seeking their
own enjoyment and comfort, contrive or promote new inventions
and when, by luxurious living, they circulate capital, that society
progresses and flourishes. In this sense private vices are public bene-
fits”15. Mandeville continues the hobbessian interpretation of the
natural egoism in men, with the great difference that he promotes
GERMÁN SCALZO
Revista Empresa y Humanismo Vol. XIII, 1/10, pp. 249-268
252
12 In seventeenth century, the predominant view of the man was a pessimistic
one, as we can see in the works of thinkers like Hobbes, Pascal, Racine, Nicole,
Domat, Mandeville, La Rochefoucald, etc. See Lázaro Cantero, R. (2002), p. 24.
13 TMS VII.ii.2.8, p. 350.
14 TMS I.i.1.1, p. II: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evi-
dently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others”.
15 Copleston, F. (1964), p. 177. See Mandeville’s Paradox, in Mandeville B. de
(1997), pp. xxviii to xxxiii.
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the individual vices for the welfare of society16. Because Mandeville
sees the quest for pleasure as the source of human actions, he can be
considered an Epicurean. 
For the Epicureans, the universality of the quest for pleasure is an
axiomatic, self evident truth, which applies to every human manifes-
tation; even though to religious matters (we love God because we
find pleasure in it). In his Confessions, Augustine analyzes this, and
in book XIX of The City of God, he attacks the Stoic idea that men
can attend happiness by their own efforts even tough standing pain.
For him, pain and suffering are evil, no matter how one looks at
them, and virtues have consistently failed to make us happy, being
nothing but a proof of the wretchedness of our human condition.
After the original sin, the human will does not control itself anymo-
re, and it is driven only by self-love. The criticism of virtues is the
dominant theme in the works of early modern Augustinian writers,
like, for example, La Rochefoucauld17, who in his Maxims shows
self-love (Augustine’s amour sui) as the driver of human actions. For
him, every human relationship is an exchange of favours, inspired by
self-love18, whose sole objective is his own existence19. 
These two interpretations are strictly incompatible, since one is hos-
tile to religion and the other comes from a Father of the Church.
However, in this field, Augustinians and Epicureans converge in the
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16 Mandeville, B. de (1988), p. 24. “Thus every Part was full of Vice, Yet the
whole Mass a Paradise […] And ever since, the worst of all the Multitude Did
something for the Common Good”.
17 La Rochefoucauld had a close relationship with Jacques Esprit, author of La
Fausseté des vertus humaines. 
18 La Rochefoucauld, F. de (1984), p. 39: “What men call friendship is just an
alliance, a pooling of mutual interests, and an exchange of favours; in short, a
commerce where self-love always sets out to obtain something”.
19 La Rochefoucauld, F. de (1984), p. 91. Maxim 1, deleted after First edition.
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centrality of pleasure as the motive of actions and they consider
human virtues a sign of arrogance and hypocrisy20. That is why they
have a common enemy, the Stoics, who claim that the chief good
resides precisely in the practice of virtue. “It is the
Epicurean/Augustinian doctrine of self-interest that Rousseau and
Smith attack from a Stoic point of view” 21, because, like most thin-
kers of the Enlightenment, they wanted to believe that the practice
of virtue is within the reach of human power. In order to do so, the
starting point is a reconstruction of Mandeville’s anthropology.
Although Mandeville mistrusts human motives, there is a passage in
his Fable of the Bees in which a sow attacks a child that provokes
“pure, unadulterated feelings of pity in any human being”22. His
purpose, in accordance with his argument that virtues are nothing
but the manifestations of various passions, was to demonstrate that
the virtue of charity is often counterfeited by the passion of pity.
However, by acknowledging that pure pity is possible, he proved
that an entirely disinterested feeling can exist in men. 
Smith makes his own use of this reference23 and begins his Theory of
Moral Sentiments with a similar argument: “how selfish soever man
may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature,
which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happi-
ness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the
pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion…”24. He
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20 Berry is not in agreement whit this distinction. He also criticizes the common
association between Smith and the neo-Stoicism. See Berry, C. (2004), p. 456.
21 Force, P. (2006), p. 49.
22 Mandeville, B. de (1988), p. 255.
23 Bert Kerkhof sees this connection in Kerkhof, B. (1995).
24 TMS I.i.1.1, p. II.
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considers pity as an empirical illustration of the psychological phe-
nomenon that he defines as sympathy25.
Rousseau had made an explicit reference to the same passage in
Discourse on the Origen of Inequality26 published four years before The
Theory of Moral Sentiments. There, he also concludes, by an ad homi-
nem argument27, that pity cannot be derived from self-interest. That
gives Rousseau a strong argument: if Mandeville himself, the most
excessive detractor of human virtues, admits pity; that is enough
proof of the existence of other principles besides self-interest28. In
order to refuse the selfish hypothesis, both thinkers used this prin-
ciple as a cornerstone in their systems: Rousseau in the form of pity
(pitié), and Smith of sympathy29. Moreover, Rousseau introduces
the term identification to refute La Rochefoucauld’s analysis of pity,
which is the equivalent of Smith’s sympathy.
Rousseau considers pity as a pre-rational faculty, made weaker by
human reason. He integrates two antagonistic principles in human
nature by a differentiation between the man in state of nature
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25 See also Lázaro Cantero, R. (2002), p. 137. “Sympathy is that principle of
human nature by which each man is interested in luck and happiness of other peo-
ple”.
26 Rousseau, J.J. (1972), p. 68.
27 That is to say, to refute someone in his own terms. 
28 The reference to Mandeville’s analysis of pity is key, because it provides
Rousseau with a first principle. Rousseau’s analysis is a reconstruction of
Mandeville’s anthropology based on pity, not self love.
29 “Smith adds that Rousseau has performed some sort of magic by transforming
Mandeville’s licentious doctrine into a system that seems to have all the purity and
key of the morals of Plato”. Force, P. (2006), p. 34. “In March 1756, in his [Smith’s]
review of Rousseau’ Second Discourse, Smith hailed Rousseau as the most impor-
tant and original French philosopher since Descartes, and presented him as the
worthy continuator of a philosophical tradition that used to thrive in England,
with authors like Hobbes, Locke, Mandeville, Shaftesbury, Butler, Clarke and
Hutcheson”. 
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(which includes the primitive and the savage) and the citizen in
modern commercial society. In the state of nature, the capacity of
pity was strong –and also the propensity for identification- and rea-
son was undeveloped. In the state of civilization, reason is fully
developed, and also the understanding of our interests, that is, self-
love; but the capacity for identification is weaker, and therefore it
does not result in pity. However, it is more developed in the sense
that we have a greater ability to see things through the eyes of
others, being an essential component in the development of amour-
propre, based on our desire to be seen favourably by others. In fact,
he conceives self-love from a neo-Stoic point of view, as a modera-
te and legitimate concern on self preservation, but, in order to diffe-
rentiate it from the Augustinian-Epicurean concept, he calls it love
of oneself30. Self-love31 (amour-propre) is the rational understanding
of our interests, as opposed to the primitive love of oneself (amour de
soi) or instinct of self-preservation. 
A similar argument can be found in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Smith calls the original instinct of human nature self-love, making
an explicit reference to the Stoics: “according to Zeno, the founder
of the Stoical doctrine, every animal was by nature recommended to
its own care, and was endowed with the principle of self-love, that
it might endeavour to preserve, not only its existence, but all the di-
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30 Rousseau, J.J. (1972), p. 147. “Amour-propre and love of oneself, two passions
very different in their Nature and their effects, must not be confused. Love of one-
self is a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to watch over his own
preservation, and which, directed in man by reason and modified by pity, pro-
duces humanity and virtue. Amour-propre is only a relative sentiment, artificial
and born in Society, which inclines each individual to have a greater esteem for
himself than for anyone else, inspires in men all the harm they do one another,
and is the true source of honour”.
31 Rousseau, J.J. (1972), p. 70. “Reason engenders amour-propre and reflection
fortifies it”. The term reason must be understood in a narrow sense as the ability
to compute, compare and reflect. 
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fferent parts of its nature, in the best and most perfect state of which
they were capable”32. Smith distinguishes between virtue and the
appearance of virtue, but this difference, far from casting a doubt on
the authenticity of human virtues, proves the fact that genuine vir-
tue is within the reach of human efforts. 
In The Wealth of Nations, Smith attributes the origins of commerce
and the division of labour to the “propensity to truck, barter, and
exchange one thing for another”33, a consequence of “the faculties of
reason and speech”34 (in close relation to the principle of sympathy).
This argument seems to be consistent with the last part of the
famous passage on the baker and the butcher: “…and never talk to
them of our own necessities but to their advantages”. This is also
consistent with the idea of self-love in Rousseau, based in reason
and reflection, in conjunction with the concept of identification,
which found its equivalent in Smith’s sympathy. Rousseau and
Smith agree that, in modern commercial society, the way of obtai-
ning the assistance of others is appealing to their self-interest. That
is to say that bettering our condition involves a rational calculation
of interests. Self-interest requires an explicit transaction, rational
calculation and a social organization that makes the transaction
possible, moving away the possibility of a general principle. 
In fact, Rousseau’s moral system has two first principles: love of
oneself (amour de soi) and pity (pitié). Smith also takes the selfish
hypothesis as the starting point and introduces the principle of
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32 TMS VII.i.3.15, p. 321.
33 “This division of labour […] is the necessary, though very slow and gradual
consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such
extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing for
another”. WN I.ii.1, p. 25.
34 WN I.ii.2, p. 25.
35 TMS II.ii.2, p. 96. There is here an explicit connection with Stoic doctrine. 
revista1-10:revista1-07.qxd  21/01/2010  20:35  Página 257
sympathy, which does not replace self-love. For him “every man is, no
doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own
care”35 and that is the reason why he “was endowed with the princi-
ple of self-love”36. There are strong axiomatic similarities between
the system Smith develops in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the
one Rousseau proposes in his Second Discourse. Smith’s system has
two first principles indeed: self-love and sympathy. The former is
similar to Rousseau’s amour de soi, the instinct for self-preservation
and immediate gratification, neither vicious nor virtuous. At the
same time, Rousseau’s amour-propre finds his equivalent in the con-
cept of vanity, a relative feeling. People driven by vanity, more than
goods and advantages, look for praise and approbation from
others37.
In The Wealth of Nations, self-love and sympathy manifest themselves
as the “passion for present enjoyment”, and “the desire of bettering
our condition” which implies that gratification must be postponed38.
The passion for present enjoyment, the same as self-love, is domi-
nant in the early stages of society, while the legal and economical
system of commercial society promotes vanity between men, and
consequently, the raise of the fortune. In order to obtain the respect
of others, we must accumulate material goods. But, at the same
time, in order to satisfy our material needs, we must seek the assis-
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36 See quote 29.
37 “To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, com-
placency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive
from it. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us”. TMS
I.iii.2, p. 61.
38 “With regard to profusion, the principle, which prompts to expense, is the pas-
sion for present enjoyment […] But the principle which prompts to save, is the
desire to bettering our condition, a desire which, though generally calm and dis-
passionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go to the
grave”. WN II.iii, p. 341.
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tance of others. And the only way of obtaining this is through per-
suasion, that is to say, appealing to their self-love. As a consequen-
ce, the driving principle is not self-love but sympathy and the desire
for sympathy; self-love is, once again, a tool for persuasion39. 
Smith does not investigate about the cause of sympathy, he assumes
it empirically, stressing that it is an original sentiment of human
nature40, that “it is often excited so directly and immediately that it
cannot reasonably be derived from self-interested affection, that is,
from self-love”41. To explain this kind of identification, he turns to
the mental activity of the imagination42, and he introduces the con-
cept of impartial spectator –a kind of moderator of self-love- in
order not to fall into subjectivism43. 
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39 In this context should be interpreted the famous passage of the butcher and the
brewer, which ends: “and never talk to them of our necessities but of their advan-
tages”. Myers highlights that “in his Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms,
Smith asserts that the real foundation of the desire to trade is that principle to per-
suade which so much prevails in human nature […] man is at heart a persuader,
an inducer, who finds trade a necessary and convenient vehicle for exercising his
propensity”. See Myers, M. (1983), p. 113.
40 See Myers, M. (1983), p. 107. “Smith feels that his explanation of moral deci-
sions, as based upon the principle of sympathy, is superior to other moral systems
because it is not concerning a matter of right… but concerning a matter of fact. He sees
his system to be based upon the facts as they exist for the weak and imperfect crea-
ture which man actually is, not for superior beings who could arrive at similar
results through the use of reason”.
41 Copleston, F. (1964), p. 356.
42 “As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no
idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves
should feel in the like situation […] by the imagination we place ourselves in his
situation”. TMS I.i.1, p. II.
43 “Though it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in his own breast,
naturally prefers himself to all mankind, […] If he would act so as that the impar-
tial spectator may enter into the principles of his conduct, which is what of all
things he has the greatest desire to do, he must, upon this, as upon all other occa-
sions, humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to something
which other men can go along with”. TMS II.ii.2, p. 97.
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Underneath the logic that a virtuous action can result from self-inte-
rest, there is another Stoic reference. Smith believes that selfish
impulses play a fundamental role in the natural order as well as the
social order. For him, the stability of society is not a consequence of
human rational design, but the consequence of the wisdom of God.
He makes an explicit comparison between the order of society and
the “economy of nature”44. Nature, in order to achieve its favourite
ends, has endowed creatures with an appetite for them and for the
means by which they can be brought about45. For Smith, a full
understanding of this convergence between nature and reason is the
supreme task of the philosopher, who seeks to discern God’s wis-
dom in all natural social phenomena. This is the traditional sense of
the word economy: the relationship between the whole and the parts.
Smith offers an economic solution to the traditional political pro-
blem of the individual interest and the public welfare, remarking the
fact that these ideas, far from being contradictory, are complemen-
tary.
When Smith talks about the economy of nature, he is referring to a
kind of providence that is known as “invisible hand”, a common
term used in English and French literature of the early Modernity46.
Charles Bonnet, whom Smith met when he stayed in Geneva in
1765, explained that what looks to us as rational behaviour, in ani-
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44 TMS II.i.5.10, p. 196.
45 For instance, being one of the favourite ends of nature the propagation of the
species, our efforts at self-preservation are primarily a consequence of instinctive
forces like hunger, thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, the love of pleasure
and the dread of pain. These forces prompt us to apply those means for their own
sakes, and without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends
which the great Director of nature intended to produce by them.
46 It appears in thinkers like Daniel Defoe, Nicolas Lenglet Dufresnoy, Charles
Rollin, Jean-Baptiste Robinet, Charles Bonnet and others. See Force, P. (2006),
p. 72.
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mals is directed by an “invisible hand”47. Smith’s reflections on the
economy of nature are very close to Bonnet’s neo-Stoic providentia-
lism. They both share the belief that there is a convergence betwe-
en natural ends and rational designs, and they also describe instinc-
tual behaviour as if it were rational. The nature’s power is often gre-
ater than the rational attempts to interfere with its course, and
because self-interest is a natural impulse, it is the safest way to assu-
re the natural harmony of the Universe.
Smith follows Shaftesbury and Butler in the convergence between
the effects of benevolent motives and the effect of selfish motives.
The social order can proceed from love, from gratitude, from
friendship, and esteem; and it can also be derived from self-inte-
rest48. The main difference between Smith’s neo-Stoic approach
and the Epicurean-Augustinian one is that the former emphasizes
the social harmony, while the latest stresses the confrontation bet-
ween men.
In The Role of Providence in the Social Order, Viner relates Smith’s
invisible hand to a form of optimistic providentialism, which beca-
me predominant in the eighteenth century, and which was not sha-
red by the followers of the Augustinian tradition (Calvinists like
Bayle or Mandeville, Jansenists like Nicole -or sympathisers like
Pascal-), because they had a pessimistic vision of the fallen men49.
Smith’s neo-Stoicism is optimistic only in a technical sense:
Providence works to optimize the outcome of the social exchange50.
The unspoken issue that lies behind the reception of the interest
doctrine is the original sin, and the dividing line is between two con-
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47 Bonnet, C. (1764), Contemplation de la nature, Amsterdam. Quoted in Force
P. (2006), p. 73.
48 Force, P. (2006), p. 82. 
49 Viner, J. (1972), p. 26. 
50 See Myers, M. (1983), p. 130 and Force, P. (2006), p. 87.
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ceptions of Providence: one that adheres to the original-sin doctri-
ne, and considers that self-love is an evil that should be put to good
use by providential action (Augustinian), and one that, in the con-
trary, finds self-love as a benign sentiment at the service of nature’s
ends (Neo-Stoic). 
Smith constructs his moral philosophy on a refutation of the
Epicurean-Augustinian concept of self-love because he sees this
position as a dangerous threat to virtue. For the Epicureans, the ulti-
mate end is pleasure; for the Augustinians, is God. For Smith, the
ultimate end is to live a good life according to nature, meaning ratio-
nally or consistently. What matters is not the outcome but the har-
monious relationship between the means and the ends, that is to say,
the economy. And because the modern economy is a well-ordered
and harmonious system, striving to become rich is the proper thing
to do. The passions of the rich and the powerful are nothing but
their interests, and as such they constitute the engine of wealth cre-
ation. Moral and political equilibrium is a consequence of the natu-
ral harmony between individual passions and the welfare of society
as a whole. 
As Hirschman points out, Smith reduces passions to interests in The
Wealth of Nations because, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he has
already described the purpose of human life as bettering our condi-
tion. The desire to become rich is the overriding passion in modern
society51. But if Smith could assume that human behaviour is gene-
rally driven by the pursuit of self-interest, was thanks to Rousseau,
who had redefined self-love as a weak passion induced by interest
calculations, and moved away from Mandeville conception of self-
love as an unpredictable passion. 
GERMÁN SCALZO
Revista Empresa y Humanismo Vol. XIII, 1/10, pp. 249-268
262
51 Hirschman, A. (1977), p. 108.
revista1-10:revista1-07.qxd  21/01/2010  20:35  Página 262
Hirschman asserts “once the idea of interest had appeared, it beca-
me a real fad as well as a paradigm (à la Kuhn) and most of human
action was suddenly explained by self-interest, sometimes to the
point of tautology”52. This idea became proverbial at the end of six-
teenth century, when it was generally assumed that “as the physical
world is ruled by the laws of movement so is the moral universe
ruled by laws of interest”53. 
The idea of interest, which first appears in the political field54, found
a greater diffusion in commerce. The belief that self-interest could
be a dominant motive of human action offered a realistic base for a
feasible social order, since it made human decisions more predicta-
ble that when they are driven by passions55. However, instead of
arguing that interests can usefully be pitted against passions -like
most of his contemporaries- Smith seems to erase the distinction
between passions and interests56, and consider them from a narrow
point of view. Passion and interests are no longer seen as a destruc-
tive force but a small element in the larger order of the Universe.
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54 “Reason of State theory” (Ragione di stato), initiated by Maquiavelo.
55 Montesquieu, in Esprit des lois, “the spirit of commerce brings with it the spi-
rit of frugality, of economy, of moderation, of work, of wisdom, of tranquility, of
order, and of regularity”, Montesquieu, C.S. (2002), p. 37. Similar arguments
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John Millar y Adam Smith. The most explicit and general position is Steuart’s,
who shows a great influence of Montesquieu in his Inquiry into the Principles of
Political Oeconomy, of 1767, in which he develops the thesis of modern economy
as a brake to despotism. This position is known as the “Montesquieu-Steuart
Doctrine”.
56 Hirschman, A. (1977), p. III.
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In response to the interest doctrine, in his Treatise of Human Nature,
Hume shows how promises were instituted to distinguish between
interested commerce and disinterested commerce57. Instead of trying to
make human nature less selfish, he institutes a convention, which
signals explicitly that the exchange is a matter of self-interest. For
Hume, this is a modern form of commerce, to be distinguished from
the older one, which relies on feelings of gratitude in order to make
exchange possible. Rather than scrutinizing the human conduct to
inquire whether the motives are selfish or generous, he focuses on
the form of human relations. The remedy to human selfishness is to
establish a conventional space where human relations are explicitly a
matter of self-interest. Self-interest is assumed by convention as the
only motive that promotes transactions. 
Rousseau criticizes Hume’s position in an idealistic defence of the
“old aristocracy”. Smith’s position is a complex one, because it cons-
titutes an attempt to reconcile the apparently incompatible positions
of Hume and Rousseau. He agrees with Rousseau’s criticism of
commercial society, but he cannot accept the conclusion Rousseau
draws from that criticism. For Smith, there are two ways of contri-
buting to the general interest: a deliberative way and an unconscious
one, which considers that selfish motives drive individuals to contri-
bute unknowingly to the public good. This way of thinking is cha-
racteristic of his neo-Stoic approach as we can see in this passage:
“He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part
of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was
no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes
that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to
promote it”58. 
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For Smith, the natural effort of every individual to better his own
condition, in a context of freedom and security, was a principle so
powerful that it could by itself conducts society to prosperity, with
independence of the political progress, because “no society can
surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of his
members are poor and miserable”59. Appealing to self-interest is the
way to persuade someone to engage in a transaction. The principle
behind the transactions is not self-interest but the propensity to bar-
ter and trade, which is based on reason and speech, and the propen-
sity to persuade. Finally, the propensity to persuade is itself based on
the principle of sympathy. In commercial society, men are driven by
vanity, and the dominant strategy consists in postponing gratifica-
tion in order to obtain the admiration of others through the accu-
mulation of wealth. In that sense, self-interest is far from being a
general explanatory principle.
Smith’s psychological analysis of human behaviour presents an eco-
nomic solution to a problem which was traditionally political and
moral. “[Smith] constructed a material proof that self-interest ope-
rating in the real world of production and trade could, indeed, be
made to serve the public welfare. In doing this Smith and his philo-
sophical predecessors created a current of optimism that dominated
the world of ideas until the end of the eighteenth century. These
positive feelings about man, socially and materially, rested on the
belief that while man was giving expression to his most natural inner
motives, which were inbred in him for his own survival, he was, at
the same time, also serving the larger interest of society”60. As a con-
sequence, capitalism received a strong and decisive impulse in order
to take on a central place in the configuration of contemporary
society. 
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